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ABSTRACT
Human mobility is highly predictable. Individuals tend to
only visit a few locations with high frequency, and to move
among them in a certain sequence reflecting their habits
and daily routine. This predictability has to be taken into
account in the design of location privacy preserving mecha-
nisms (LPPMs) in order to effectively protect users when
they continuously expose their position to location-based
services (LBSs). In this paper, we describe a method for
creating LPPMs that are customized for a user’s mobility
profile taking into account privacy and quality of service re-
quirements. By construction, our LPPMs take into account
the sequential correlation across the user’s exposed loca-
tions, providing the maximum possible trajectory privacy,
i.e., privacy for the user’s present location, as well as past
and expected future locations. Moreover, our LPPMs are
optimal against a strategic adversary, i.e., an attacker that
implements the strongest inference attack knowing both the
LPPM operation and the user’s mobility profile. The op-
timality of the LPPMs in the context of trajectory privacy
is a novel contribution, and it is achieved by formulating
the LPPM design problem as a Bayesian Stackelberg game
between the user and the adversary. An additional benefit
of our formal approach is that the design parameters of the
LPPM are chosen by the optimization algorithm.
1. INTRODUCTION
Location-Based Services (LBSs) provide users with valu-
able information about their surroundings such as traffic sta-
tus (e.g., Beat the Traffic, or INRIX Traffic Maps, Routes
& Alerts), nearby points of interest (e.g., Google Maps), or
friends’ activities (e.g., Foursquare or Google Latitude). De-
spite this benefit, information about our current, future, or
frequently-visited locations is highly sensitive, as it can be
used to infer our habits, preferences, political and religious
affiliations, as well as to endanger our physical security if it
falls in the wrong hands.
Hence, the need arises to protect the location privacy of
LBS’ users, while maintaining the usability and quality of
these services. The task at hand must account for the three
following considerations:
First and foremost, as Shannon’s maxim states, “One
ought to design systems under the assumption that the en-
emy will immediately gain full familiarity with them.” In
other words, the adversary will adapt his attack to the pro-
tection mechanism. This in turn shall lead to an updated
mechanism, then to a novel attack, and so on ad infinitum.
This is commonly known as the arms-race problem. To cut
the arms race short, in our approach the defender antici-
pates the adversary’s reaction, and so the initial design is
already robust against an informed adversary.
Second, in order to facilitate the deployment of a Loca-
tion Privacy Preserving Mechanism (LPPM) users must be
able to use it independently of other users’ behavior, and
without the permission or collaboration of a third party. In
other words, a usable privacy-preserving mechanism must be
user-centric, in the sense that decisions taken to protect pri-
vacy (e.g., hiding, perturbing, or faking the location) need
to be made locally to the users. Our approach only requires
users to perform a local look-up in a pre-computed table,
and hence it can be easily integrated in mobile devices fre-
quently used to access LBSs.
Third, protecting the user’s current location is intricately
bound with protecting her past and future locations. Differ-
ent LBSs require the user location to be updated at different
rates. Some require frequent updates (e.g., finding nearby
friends, or obtaining live traffic information), while others
can function perfectly well with just a single location (e.g.,
seeking nearby points of interest). The privacy protection
offered by an LPPM is severely impacted by the frequency
with which locations are revealed, since locations exposed
in quick succession are highly correlated. When correlated
locations are exposed, inferring the user’s current location
provides the adversary with tools to reduce the uncertainty
on the user’s immediate past or future whereabouts. Our
LPPMs take location correlation into account to effectively
protect a user’s location privacy along her trajectory.
We propose a framework to design user-centric LPPMs
that – given a user’s quality requirements, privacy require-
ments, and mobility profile – can (1) protect the privacy of
past locations (i.e., the current obfuscation is chosen to be
compatible with past ones), (2) protect the privacy of future
locations (i.e., the current obfuscation is chosen to be com-
patible with the likely next locations) (3) protect the privacy
of transitions between locations (i.e., even though two suc-
cessive locations may not be individually sensitive, the act
of going from the first to the second might be sensitive),
(4) protect locations that the user visits between two LBS
accesses (i.e., locations that the user visits without issuing
an LBS query from them). To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first work that addresses the two latter objectives
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as separate targets in need of protection. The two former
objectives have already been addressed in the literature, but
the protection techniques are non-optimal (e.g., they do not
consider informed adversaries, or they do not operate in a
user-centric manner).
Our LPPMs can find the optimal privacy protection in
any given scenario, i.e., they provably achieve the best pro-
tection among all possible mechanisms against a strategic
adversary with knowledge of mobility profiles and LPPM
algorithm. In other words, an LPPM designed under our
framework provides a level of privacy that constitutes an
upper bound on the privacy that is achievable by any other
defense. The proposed framework can handle a wide range
of correlation levels without making any prior assumption
on the user mobility and LBS access patterns: From cases
where there is high correlation between exposed locations,
such as location-based services that require continuous re-
quests to the provider (e.g., navigating with Google maps),
to cases in which there is complete independence among ex-
posed locations, such as LBS that require sporadic location
updates (e.g., checking-in in Foursquare).
The key technique used in our solution is a Bayesian Stack-
elberg game between the privacy defender and adversary,
launched by the user every time she wishes to share her lo-
cation with the LBS. The two main benefits of this game
theory technique are the following. First, it can naturally
express the objective of optimizing privacy under the double
constraint of anticipating the adversary’s attack and respect-
ing the user’s quality requirements. Second, it allows us to
efficiently search in an infinite space of potential solutions,
guaranteeing that the computed solution is optimal without
testing each and every single one of them (computationally
impossible) and without limiting ourselves to the heuristic
(but undeniably creative) solutions that human ingenuity
can concoct. We provide a general design method that can
be instantiated for particular privacy objectives, periods of
observation and patterns of exposure. For the sake of il-
lustration, we also provide examples to specifically protect
two plausible privacy objectives: protecting the most recent
locations (including the current one) and protecting the cur-
rent and future locations.
We run our solution on real users’ trajectories to obtain
optimal location obfuscation mechanisms that maximize pri-
vacy, defined as the adversary’s error in estimating the user’s
true location. Our results show that our method is more ef-
fective at protecting location privacy than protection mech-
anisms that only consider the currently exposed locations.
We also show that quality of service can be traded off for
privacy, but the maximum privacy achievable is strongly de-
pendent on users’ behavior (i.e., on the predictability of their
movements).
2. RELATEDWORK
In this section, we qualitatively compare our approach to
previous work on location privacy. This comparison focuses
on schemes that provide trajectory privacy [8] rather than
sporadic privacy [22, 9, 7], i.e., privacy of locations exposed
to the LBS independently of each other. A quantitative com-
parison with the latter is provided in Section 6, where we
show that our trajectory-aware approach outperforms spo-
radic privacy-preserving mechanisms when protecting tra-
jectories.
A first class of trajectory-aware mechanisms in the liter-
ature are those that aim at protecting user privacy when
trajectories are published in bulk. Protection is achieved by
grouping trajectories of different users in a wide area to en-
sure that the aggregate trajectory can be ascribed to at least
k users [1]; mixing the trajectories of k users [16]; eliminating
some events from the published dataset [14, 23]; or replac-
ing locations with larger regions defined by a pre-defined
grid [13]. Along similar lines, some protection algorithms
need access to the complete trajectory before protection can
be applied [25], or they delay the exposure of queries so as
to gather additional information about subsequent user lo-
cations [12, 3]. In contrast, our approach decides in real
time how to protect a given location that the user is about
to expose.
Other trajectory-aware mechanisms assume the existence
of a trusted third party (e.g., the cellular service provider) [17,
11], or assume that nearby users are present and can be
leveraged to achieve joint privacy protection [4, 10, 15]. Both
of these scenarios violate the user-centricity design require-
ment in this paper. Not depending on other users is also the
reason why k-anonymity does not apply in our case, as well
as any other method that attempts to make a user indistin-
guishable from other users.
In addition to addressing trajectory privacy in a user-
centric and real-time manner, our major qualitative differ-
ence from prior work is that we address the problem for-
mally. This has two main advantages. First, it allows to
provide provably optimal privacy against any adversary de-
scribable by our model. Second, it allows to define fine-
grained knobs for expressing the user’s privacy and qual-
ity requirements. We achieve these properties by formaliz-
ing the privacy-preserving mechanism design problem as a
Bayesian Stackelberg game, similarly to Shokri et al. [22]
who focused on sporadic exposures. We would like to em-
phasize that our approach is not an extension to Shokri et al.,
but uses the same methodology to achieve a different goal,
i.e., to protect trajectory privacy instead of sporadically ex-
posed locations.
The only other formal approach that we are aware of is
Andre´s et al. [2], who extend the concept of differential pri-
vacy to location privacy, thus defining a new privacy metric:
geo-indistinguishability. They also propose a mechanism to
achieve it. Similarly to Shokri et al., Andre´s et al. focus on
sporadic disclosures, stating that in the case of successive
location disclosures, the geo-indistinguishability that their
mechanism provides decreases linearly in the number of dis-
closed locations. However, this solution is not optimal and
can be outperformed by [22] in the case of assuming a prior.
In Section 6, we show that our algorithm compares favorably
against that of Shokri et al. when protecting trajectory pri-
vacy, hence we can conclude that our algorithm also offers
better protection than that of Andre´s et al.. Chatzikoko-
lakis et al. [6] extend the geo-indistinguishability framework
to mobility traces. However, the solution is not optimal.
Bordenabe et al. [5] provide the solution for constructing op-
timal differential private obfuscation mechanisms. Shokri [20]
designs user-centric obfuscation mechanisms that are opti-
mal both with respect to the differential privacy metric and
the prior leakage from the user. These optimization prob-
lems, however, are not applied on trajectory privacy. Thus,
to the best of our knowledge, our work is the first formal
solution to optimize trajectory privacy.
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(a) Time t − 1: real lo-
cation (2,2) (©); exposed
pseudolocation (2,2) ().
Since the user moves only
to adjacent locations, at
time t she will be in the bot-
tom left 4x4 square.
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(b) Time t: real location
(3,3) (©); exposed pseu-
dolocation (4,4) (). The
user can only be in the dark
2x2 square, rather than the
3x3 square (
 
).
Figure 1: Ignoring correlation when choosing exposed pseu-
dolocations can compromise the user’s current location.
3. TRAJECTORY PRIVACY
Users’ movements are not isolated discrete events. Rather,
users follow a path to arrive from one place to another, fol-
lowing a trajectory. Along this trajectory, users may query a
location-based service to obtain useful information concern-
ing the surroundings or the arrival point. Queries may be
launched continuously in time, or only at selected spots. The
former reveals the whole trajectory to the service provider,
while the latter hides some parts. However, even if not all
points in the trajectory are exposed to the service provider,
the correlation between consecutive positions implies that
inferring just one of them reveals information about past
and future ones. For instance, spatio-temporal constraints
(e.g., maximum user velocity), or road configuration and di-
rection, may reveal with high probability the route followed
by a user between two successive location exposures. The
higher the level of correlation, the more information is re-
vealed.
The correlation between successively shared locations de-
pends on two factors: randomness of user mobility patterns
and LBS access frequency. The former relates to how pre-
dictable a user’s future location is given her current location.
The latter defines the rate at which the LBS provider can
sample the user’s trajectory. These two factors act mul-
tiplicatively on correlation, but they have opposite effects.
On the one hand, high randomness decreases correlation be-
tween successively exposed locations, since the current posi-
tion contains less information about past and future events
than when movements are deterministic. On the other hand,
high LBS access frequency increases correlation, since re-
gardless of the randomness of her movements the user has
little time to move between two LBS accesses and exposed lo-
cations are nearer to each other than when access frequency
is low.
Considering correlation between exposed locations is of ut-
most importance when designing privacy protection mecha-
nisms for location-based services in which the location has to
be exposed frequently to the LBS provider. We now show,
through a toy example, that ignoring the correlation be-
tween successive locations leaks information that allows the
adversary to reduce her uncertainty about past and/or fu-
ture locations of the user. Let us consider that a user moves
around in a 5x5 grid, moving at most one location per time
unit (see Figure 1). This user accesses an LBS using an
LPPM that, given a real location (x, y), outputs a pseudolo-
cation chosen arbitrarily from the 3x3 square centered on
(x, y), {(x + i, y + j), i = {−1, 0, 1}, j = {−1, 0, 1}}. This
pseudolocation is then sent to the LBS. The LBS, which ob-
serves the exposed pseudolocations, tries to infer the user’s
movements using prior knowledge of the LPPM algorithm
and of the user behavior.
First, assume that the user has accessed the LBS from lo-
cation (2,2) at time t− 1 and the LPPM reported pseudolo-
cation (2,2), as shown in Figure 1a. The adversary can infer
that the user could only have been in the bottom-left 3x3
square of locations – these are the only locations from which
the LPPM may output (2,2), represented by
 
. Moreover,
since the user can move by at most one location per time
unit, the adversary knows that at time t she will be some-
where inside the bottom-left 4x4 square (see Figure 1a).
The user accesses the LBS again at time t from loca-
tion (3,3), reporting pseudolocation (4,4). Naively, one may
think that the probability of the adversary correctly guessing
her real location is 1/9 (a random location in the 3x3 square
surrounding location (4,4)), similarly to time t − 1. How-
ever, given the prior observation the adversary knows that
at time t the user can only be in the bottom-left 4x4 square.
Intersecting this knowledge with her current observation the
adversary can deduce that the user is in the darkened 2x2
square in Figure 1b. Therefore, the probability of a cor-
rect guess is 1/4, more than twice as much than the naively
expected 1/9. This example highlights that choosing pseu-
dolocations disregarding correlation may reduce the privacy
of the current location.
Now consider the example in Figure 2, where the LPPM
reports (1,1) at time t − 1 instead of reporting (2,2), and
reports (4,4) at time t. In this case, the real locations at
both t − 1 and t are completely compromised: The only
two-step trajectory that is compatible with the successive
exposure of pseudolocations (1,1) and (4,4) is that the user
accessed the LBS from (2,2) followed by (3,3). Strikingly,
the privacy of past locations was retroactively compromised :
it was safe until the pseudolocation at time t was reported.
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(a) Time t − 1: real lo-
cation (2,2) (©); exposed
pseudolocation (1,1) ().
Since the user moves only
to adjacent locations, time
t she will be in the bottom
left 3x3 square.
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(b) Time t:real location
(3,3) (©); exposed pseu-
dolocation (4,4) (). The
attacker can infer that at
t− 1 the user could only be
at location (2,2), and at t
she can only be at location
(3,3).
Figure 2: Naively choosing a pseudolocation may compro-
mise not only the current but also the past location(s) of the
user.
Similarly, the pseudolocation chosen at time t can affect
future privacy. Consider a user at (2,2) at time t, who knows
that she will go to (3,3) at t + 1. If the LPPM chooses to
expose pseudolocation (1,1) at time t, then at t+ 1 the user
will not be able to expose (4,4) without revealing her real
location at both t and t + 1. Hence, the choice at t has an
impact on the possible choices at t+1. In other words, future
privacy may be proactively compromised by current choices.
The conclusion from these examples, and the motivation
for our design, is that LPPMs need to choose pseudolo-
cations that are compatible both with previously exposed
pseudolocations and with possible future movements. Com-
patibility means that, even if an adversary is aware of the
LPPM’s inner workings and of the user’s general mobility
pattern, he should not be able to infer the user’s real loca-
tions from the exposed pseudolocations. Our design finds
the optimal way to expose pseudolocations without restrict-
ing choice to a fixed pattern, e.g., to a uniform selection
from a 3x3 square around the user. On the contrary, any
pseudolocation can be chosen with any probability, aiming
at maximizing privacy in the best possible way against an
informed adversary.
4. PROBLEM STATEMENT
User Mobility and LBS Access Pattern. Consider a user
moving within M discrete locations R = {r1, r2, . . . , rM}.
The user’s movements are represented as a discrete-time tra-
jectory of locations at times T = {1, 2, . . .}. An event 〈r, t〉
denotes that the user is at location r ∈ R at time t ∈ T .
Slightly abusing notation, the time-subscripted variable rt
will denote the user’s location at time t. Typical values from
R are r, ri, rj , whereas typical time-subscripted locations are
rt, rt−1, rt+1.
The mobility of the user is modeled probabilistically. In
our implementation, we choose to model mobility as a first-
order Markov chain on R, but this is not mandatory. Any
other model is possible, as long as it allows us to compute
probabilities of the user visiting various sequences of loca-
tions. We note that our contribution is not tied to the first-
order Markov choice since our method can compute the op-
timal protection for any given mobility model.
As the user moves, she accesses the LBS at each time
instant t ∈ T , i.e., from each location that she visits. We
assume this for simplicity, and in the appendix we show that
we can accommodate sparser LBS-access patterns. After all,
the most interesting case is when LBS-access times are close
enough to each other so that successively exposed locations
are correlated. If they are not, the problem becomes equiv-
alent to sporadic location disclosure, studied in [22].
LPPM Functionality. The user wants to protect her pri-
vacy from an adversary who observes the locations exposed
to the LBS (so the adversary could be the LBS provider
itself, an eavesdropper, other LBS users, etc.). Hence, she
uses an LPPM that obfuscates her real locations before they
are sent to the LBS. We model obfuscation as a replacement
operation in which a fake location from a setR′ is sent to the
LBS instead of the real location. We take R′ to be the same
as R. We call these fake locations pseudolocations or obfus-
cated locations and denote them by r′. The corresponding
events 〈r′, t〉 are termed pseudoevents.
The problem we tackle is the design of an LPPM algorithm
f(·) that takes as input the real location (or locations) to
T
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Figure 3: A user moves from location (3, 4) at time t− 2, to
(4,3) at t− 1, to (4, 2) at current time t. The user wants to
protect locations at times t−1 and t, and these are denoted
by atrg (target events). At past times t − 2 and t − 1, the
LPPM exposed pseudolocations (3, 3) and (3, 2) (denoted
by opre), and to protect atrg the LPPM currently exposes
location (3, 1) (denoted by opost).
be protected and the pseudolocations previously sent to the
adversary, and then probabilistically selects the pseudoloca-
tion (or pseudolocations) to expose to the adversary. The
pseudolocation set is fixed, and it coincides with the location
set. The adversary knows the probabilistic model that de-
scribes user mobility, and also knows the LPPM algorithm
f(·). Notice here the self-reference: We design f(·) assuming
an adversary who knows the f(·) that will be designed and
can respond optimally to it.
We introduce the notation used throughout the paper with
the example shown in Figure 3. Assuming that the current
time is t, the elements of the framework can be defined as
follows:
• atrg denotes the target events that the user wants to
protect, or equivalently, the events that the adver-
sary wants to infer. In the example, the user wants
to protect her location at times t − 1 and t and thus
atrg = (rt−1, rt) = {〈(4, 3), t− 1〉, 〈(4, 2), t〉}.
• opre is a subset of the pseudoevents that the LPPM cre-
ated and sent to the LBS up to but before the current
time. These are the pseudoevents that matter for the
estimation of atrg: Typically, opre would be a sequence
of consecutive pseudoevents starting with a recent time
instant (as old ones do not matter for estimating atrg)
and leading up to the current time. These are known
both to the adversary and to the LPPM. In the ex-
ample, the relevant pseudolocations were exposed at
times t − 1 and t − 2 and thus opre = (r′t−2, r′t−1) =
{〈(3, 3), t− 2〉, 〈(3, 2), t− 1〉}.
• opost is the pseudolocation (or set of pseudolocations)
that the LPPM produces to protect atrg and that will
be sent to the LBS at current time. In the example, at
current time t the user exposes pseudolocation (3, 1)
thus opost = (r
′
t) = {〈(3, 1), t〉}.
atrg f()
LPPM
h()
Attack
opost aˆtrg
P , opre f()
Figure 4: Information available to the LPPM and the adver-
sary: The LPPM wants to protect location(s) atrg by pro-
ducing appropriate pseudolocation(s) opost. The adversary
observes the output opost of the LPPM and, using his knowl-
edge of the LPPM function f , estimates atrg; the adversary’s
estimate is aˆtrg. The prior knowledge of the adversary and
of the LPPM consists of the transition matrix P and the
pseudolocations opre that have been produced in the past.
• f(opost|atrg, opre) is the probability that the LPPM
produces opost, given its knowledge opre and the loca-
tions atrg it is trying to protect. This function encodes
the defensive mechanism. It can be viewed as a code-
book that prescribes, for each value of atrg and opre, a
randomization over the possible values of opost.
Notice that atrg need not be the same length as opost: In the
example, the LPPM exposes the current (time t only) pseu-
doevent, while aiming to protect the events of the current
as well as the previous time instant (t and t− 1).
Attacker Model and Privacy Metric. In short, privacy is
quantified as the adversary’s error in estimating the user’s
true location(s) atrg. Figure 4 illustrates the information
flow of events and pseudoevents to the LPPM and to the
adversary. The detailed notation is as follows:
• ψ(atrg|opre) is the adversary’s prior probability dis-
tribution on the inference target atrg, given his prior
knowledge opre. It encodes what the adversary can de-
duce about atrg before observing the LPPM’s current
output opost.
• aˆtrg denotes the adversary’s estimate of atrg. Similarly
to atrg, it can be seen as a time-indexed vector whose
elements belong to the set R of locations.
• h(aˆtrg|opre, opost) is the probability that the adversary
estimates aˆtrg to be the true value of atrg, given his
knowledge of prior pseudolocations opre and given the
pseudolocation(s) opost exposed at current time t. Note
that, by definition, h(.) can contain multiple observed
exposed pseudolocations that happen across any time
period (e.g., multiple days).
• dp(aˆtrg, atrg) ≥ 0 is the privacy gain when the adver-
sary’s estimate is aˆtrg and the true value of the infer-
ence target is atrg. It is zero only if aˆtrg = atrg. The
value of dp for each pair of locations needs to be pro-
vided by the user in order to reflect the sensitivity of
the user with respect to different location. The user
needs to provide low values if she is sensitive towards
a particular location atrg. We treat dp as an input to
our framework.
The privacy that an LPPM f(·) achieves against an ad-
versary implementing attack h(.) is then the expected value
of dp(aˆtrg, atrg), given prior observations opre:
Privacy(ψ, f, h, dp; opre) = E{dp(aˆtrg, atrg)|opre} (1)
=
∑
atrg,aˆtrg
Pr{aˆtrg, atrg}dp(aˆtrg, atrg)
=
∑
atrg
opost
aˆtrg
ψ(atrg|opre)f(opost|atrg, opre)h(aˆtrg|opre, opost)
dp(aˆtrg, atrg).
This formula represents the adversary’s expected estima-
tion error. As a pessimistic alternative quantification of pri-
vacy, one could take the minimum estimation error over all
possible values of atrg, which would correspond to a worst-
case scenario.
Regarding dp(aˆtrg, atrg), intuitively it can be seen as a
distance between aˆtrg and atrg that measures the similarity
between the inferred and real locations with respect to the
user’s privacy concerns. For instance, it can be the sum,
the minimum, or the maximum of the Euclidean distances
between the corresponding locations of each vector, i.e., the
total, minimum, or maximum error of the adversary over
each pair of corresponding locations in the two vectors. Al-
ternatively, it could be the Hamming distance between the
two vectors, i.e., the number of locations at which the esti-
mate differs from the true value.
The function dp(aˆtrg, atrg) may also be a weighted sum,
minimum, or maximum to encode the privacy sensitivity of
individual locations r ∈ atrg. For example, when r is a very
sensitive location the contribution of estimating rˆ ∈ aˆtrg to
dp(aˆtrg, atrg) could be large even if r and rˆ differ by very
little.
Furthermore, dp(aˆtrg, atrg) can encode the privacy sensi-
tivity of transitions between locations, rather than individual
locations taken separately. For instance, visiting the bank
and visiting a government official may not be very sensitive
if considered separately, but visiting the official immediately
after the bank may be much more sensitive, especially if the
user just made a large withdrawal from the bank and the of-
ficial is in charge of land development licensing. Moreover,
transitions between regions reveal the direction of travel.
For instance, the adversary may learn whether the user en-
ters or exits a building, e.g., a hospital.
Depending on the privacy concerns of the user, and whether
she wants to protect sensitive locations or sensitive transi-
tions between locations, an appropriate dp(·) needs to be
chosen. A useful observation is that some dp(·) definitions
are more general than others: a dp(·) that protects the tran-
sition between two successive locations automatically pro-
tects the locations themselves, so it could be used to protect
both objectives simultaneously.
Quality Metric. Sending pseudoevents instead of true events
to the LBS may help with privacy, but it also degrades the
quality of the response that the LBS sends back. We model
as follows the quality loss stemming from exposing pseudolo-
cations:
• qtrg denotes the relevant events with respect to qual-
ity. Similarly to atrg, qtrg is a time-indexed vector.
However, its time indices are not necessarily the same
as those of atrg: The locations/times that matter for
quality may be different from the ones that matter for
privacy.
• dq(qtrg, opost, opre) represents the quality loss when qtrg
is the true value of the quality-relevant events, the
LPPM currently reports opost and it has reported opre
in the past. The function dq is an input to our frame-
work and it reflects the value of accurate location infor-
mation for the service provider to return useful service
to the user. It also reflect the user’s requirements with
respect to the quality of the service. Hence, it needs
to be determined by the user.
The expected quality loss caused by an LPPM f(·) is the
expected value of dq(qtrg, opost, opre) over all qtrg and opost,
for a given history opre:
Qloss(f, dq, opre) = E{dq(qtrg, opost, opre)|opre} (2)
=
∑
qtrg,opost
Pr{qtrg, opost|opre}dq(qtrg, opost, opre)
=
∑
qtrg,opost
Pr{qtrg|opre}Pr{opost|qtrg, opre}dq(qtrg, opost, opre)
In the equation above, f(·) is hidden in Pr{opost|qtrg, opre},
which can be unwrapped as
Pr{opost|qtrg, opre} =
∑
atrg
Pr{opost, atrg|qtrg, opre} (3)
=
∑
atrg
Pr{opost|atrg, qtrg, opre}Pr{atrg|qtrg, opre}
=
∑
atrg
f(opost|atrg, opre)Pr{atrg|qtrg, opre}.
We assume that there is a maximum expected quality loss
Qmaxloss that users are willing to tolerate. Formally,
Qloss(f, dq, opre) ≤ Qmaxloss . (4)
The quality loss dq(qtrg, opost, opre) can be seen as a dis-
tance between two vectors: qtrg and the combination of
opost, opre. It will be zero if an accurate, noiseless trajec-
tory is reported by the LPPM (i.e., if these two vectors are
identical), but otherwise it will be positive. If the appli-
cation needs high location precision to function well, then
dq(·) will be large even for a small difference between qtrg
and opost, opre.
Moreover, dq(·) can encode the variable sensitivity across
locations. For example, in a location with many nearby
restaurants, an application that finds the nearest restau-
rant can tolerate a lot of noise, while isolated areas may
require more precision. The quality loss function can be
instantiated, among other possibilities, as a Euclidean or
Hamming distance between real (qtrg) and reported loca-
tions (opost, opre).
The versatility of dq(·) extends to encoding quality loss
for applications that depend on the whole trajectory of lo-
cations, rather than just on a single location. For example,
consider a car insurance company that monitors the driv-
ing behavior of a customer: quantities such as speed and
sudden acceleration or deceleration cannot be evaluated on
single locations. Alternatively, one can imagine an discount
coupon application that sends different coupons to a user
who just visited a sports-shoes store and then a baseball
stadium (possibly an amateur baseball player) from a user
who visited a general-shoe store after the sports-shoe store
(possibly just out buying shoes for the family).
4.1 Sparse LBS Access Pattern
We have assumed that the user accesses the LBS at ev-
ery single time instant although in reality one cannot expect
that LBS accesses are uninterrupted (e.g., users may access
an online navigation system to travel around some parts of
a city, but not in others). In this scenario, the adversary
may not only be interested in inferring locations from where
the user accesses the LBS, but may also be concerned about
the user’s whereabouts between two LBS accesses, i.e., at
times when there are no corresponding exposed pseudoloca-
tions. Therefore, these intermediate locations also need to
be protected (recall objective (4) in the introduction).
Our dense-LBS-access assumption can also express such
a privacy objective. We can accommodate these inference
targets by extending the definition of dp(aˆtrg, atrg) to incor-
porate the privacy sensitivity of any intermediate locations
that the adversary can infer from aˆtrg. For example, as-
sume that, from the estimates rˆt−1 and rˆt of locations rt−1
and rt, the adversary can produce estimates for two inter-
mediate locations visited at t − 1 +  and t −  (e.g., the
attacker can use Viterbi decoding [19] if she wants to in-
fer the most likely trajectory, or the forward-backward al-
gorithm [19] if she wants to compute the probability dis-
tribution of locations at some times between t − 1 and t).
In this case, dp((rˆt−1, rˆt), (rt−1, rt)) would be expressed as
dp((rˆt−1, rˆt−1+, . . . , rˆt−, rˆt), (rt−1, rt−1+, . . . , rt−, rt)). We
note that this approach to handling the estimation of such
“in-between” locations, i.e., locations where the LBS is not
accessed, is not particular to LPPMs designed under our
framework. It can be used to complement other privacy-
preserving solutions in the literature.
5. TRAJECTORY PRIVACY AS A STACK-
ELBERG GAME
5.1 General Privacy Scenario
As we have discussed in Section 4, our goal is to design an
LPPM that protects user privacy (by maximizing dp), while
preserving quality of service (by respecting the maximum
quality loss threshold Qmaxloss for dq). Designing an LPPM
reduces to choosing appropriate values for the probabilities
f(opost|atrg, opre). In addition, the design process must an-
ticipate that the adversary will know the values chosen for f ,
which means that she will choose the attack h accordingly.
Figure 5 details the reasoning involved in solving our task,
which is equivalent to solving a Stackelberg game. The dis-
tinguishing feature of this game is that there is a leader,
who commits to a choice, and a follower, who observes the
leader’s choice and then makes a choice of his own. In our
task, the leader is the user and her choice is the LPPM,
the follower is the adversary who chooses an attack given
the user’s choice. The Stackelberg equilibrium is a pair
of choices (f∗ for the LPPM and h∗ for the attack) such
that neither the user nor the adversary would gain anything
by changing their respective choices. In other words, h∗
is the choice that minimizes privacy against f∗, and f∗ is
the choice that maximizes privacy against an adversary who
will make her choice after observing f∗ while respecting the
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Figure 5: The LPPM can choose among an infinite selec-
tion of probability functions f . For each one of the f , the
adversary chooses one of his infinite selection of attacks h
to minimize Privacy(f, h); for instance, h2 is the best re-
sponse to f1, resulting in Privacy P12, and h1 is the best
response to f2, resulting in Privacy P21. Call hmin(f) the
minimizing h for a given f . Anticipating the adversary’s
choice for each f , the LPPM chooses the f that maximizes
Privacy(f, hmin(f)); for instance, if P12 > P21, the LPPM
would choose f1 over f2. Call fmax the maximizing f . The
resulting pair fmax, hmin(fmax) is the Stackelberg equilib-
rium, and the privacy achieved is Privacy(fmax, hmin(fmax)).
quality constraint. Note that f∗ does not necessarily max-
imize privacy against h∗, i.e., if the user could be certain
that the adversary would choose h∗, then a better choice
than f∗ could exist. The LPPM design tries to limit the
worst possible privacy loss, knowing only that the adversary
will choose the most effective attack against whatever f the
LPPM implements.
Formally, the general LPPM design task is to choose f
and h that solve the Stackelberg game max-minimization
max
f
min
h
Privacy(ψ, f, h, dp; opre) (5)
subject to
Qloss(f, dq, opre) ≤ Qmaxloss . (6)
Other than f and h, all functions and parameters ψ, dp,
opre, dq, Q
max
loss are inputs to the problem: ψ – the user’s
mobility, and dp – the user’s location sensitivity, are specific
to the user we aim to protect; the last two dq, Q
max
loss are
specific to the LBS application and perhaps also depend
on the user’s tolerance to quality deterioration; the prior
observations opre depend on the particular time when the
user wants to protect her privacy.
We now give two specific examples of the general LPPM
design task for two plausible privacy objectives. The first
objective is to protect the k + 1 most recent locations (in-
cluding the current one at time t), having already exposed
pseudolocations for the k past time instants, by choosing an
appropriate pseudolocation to expose at time t. The sec-
ond objective is to protect the current and future locations,
assuming nothing has been exposed so far, by choosing a
pseudolocation for time t and for future time instants. We
emphasize that one can instantiate any number of objectives
by selecting the time period one wishes to protect (atrg),
the events that have been exposed already (opre), and the
time period for which the LPPM can expose pseudolocations
(opost).
5.2 Joint Protection of Past-Present Locations
Consider a user who, at time t, wants to publish her lo-
cation rt. She has already published her locations rτ at the
k previous time instants τ = {t− 1, t− 2, . . . , t− k}. These
locations have been sent by the LPPM to the LBS as pseu-
dolocations oτ . As explained in Section 4, locations exposed
prior to time t − k, i.e., from 1 to t − k − 1, are considered
to have no influence on the choice of the user at time t.
The simplest privacy objective (atrg) that the user could
have is to protect her current location only: atrg = rt. We
call this single location privacy. But as we have argued in
Section 3, the transition from the previous location rt−1 to
the current position may be sensitive, or, in general, the
transition from the k-tuple rτ to rt may be sensitive. A
different objective, therefore, is to protect the whole vector
rτ in addition to rt: atrg = (rt, rτ ). Observe that the lat-
ter objective (transition privacy) is more general the pre-
vious one (single location privacy): Choosing a function
dp((rˆt, rˆτ ), (rt, rτ )) that just ignores rτ and rˆτ makes the
two cases equivalent.
The prior observations opre are the set of pseudolocations
oτ , and the pseudolocation opost that the LPPM produces
is just the one corresponding to the current time t: ot. The
quality loss dq is a function of past and present exposed
pseudolocations, (ot, oτ ), and of qtrg. As stated in Section 4
qtrg does not need to coincide with atrg, and can consist of
any subset of events from time 1 up to and including t. In
fact, it does not even need to overlap with (rt, rτ ).
Making the appropriate substitutions in (1), we derive the
privacy definition for the specific case of protecting past and
present locations as follows:
Privacy(ψ, f, h, dp; oτ ) =
∑
rt,rτ ,ot,rˆt,rˆτ
ψ(rt, rτ |oτ )
f(ot|rt, rτ , oτ )
h(rˆt, rˆτ |ot, oτ )
dp((rˆt, rˆτ ), (rt, rτ ))
(7)
The quality loss is also straightforward to define using (2):
Qloss(f, dq, opre) = E{dq(qtrg, ot, oτ )|oτ}
=
∑
qtrg,ot
Pr{qtrg, ot|oτ}dq(qtrg, ot, oτ )
=
∑
qtrg,ot
Pr{qtrg|oτ}Pr{ot|qtrg, oτ}dq(qtrg, ot, oτ )
(8)
Notice that setting k = 0 eliminates opre (which would
mean that none of the previous pseudolocations exposed to
the adversary are assumed to correlate with the current lo-
cation), and the target events atrg reduce to the current time
t only. In total, only the current location matters for privacy
and for quality, and the design task reduces to the sporadic
case handled by Shokri et al.’s framework [21].
5.3 Joint Protection of Present-Future Loca-
tions
We now consider a user who, as before, wants to publish
her location rt at time t. However, in contrast with the
previous case, she is not concerned about the past locations
she has visited, but rather about future ones. This concern
can be motivated as follows:
Disclosing the current location might not be important
in and of itself, but it might make it much easier for the
adversary to infer the next location, which happens to be
very sensitive. For instance, the user might currently be on a
street that only leads to an abortion clinic. Hence, disclosing
her current location is almost equivalent to disclosing that
she will go to the clinic. Symmetrically, her current location
might be very sensitive, and her next (expected) location
can be linked easily to her current one. For instance, she
might about to leave the abortion clinic and enter a street
that is only used as the clinic’s exit. Furthermore, as argued
in Section 3, neither the current nor the next location might
be particularly sensitive separately, but the transition from
one to the other might be.
The conclusion in all these cases is that the current lo-
cation must be protected jointly with the (possible) next
one(s), where the user will be at time t + 1 and later. For
this reason, atrg includes time subscripts larger than t, and
so does opost, i.e., the LPPM should take into account at the
present time t what it is likely to output in future times, so
that the current choice of ot does not limit future choices.
The intuition is that the LPPM should choose the current
pseudolocation ot so that future paths that the user will
likely take can be protected with pseudolocations that are
compatible with ot.
For simplicity, we consider an example where (a) the LPPM
anticipates only the next location, rather than many succes-
sive future locations, so atrg is (rt+1, rt) and opost is (ot+1, ot),
and (b) no prior locations matter for privacy, so opre is omit-
ted.
Substituting in (1), privacy in this example is defined as
Privacy(ψ, f, h, dp) =∑
rt+1,rt
ot+1,ot
rˆt+1,rˆt
ψ(rt+1, rt)f(ot+1, ot|rt+1, rt)
h(rˆt+1, rˆt|ot+1, ot)dp((rˆt+1, rˆt), (rt+1, rt)), (9)
and the quality loss, from (2), is defined for a general qtrg as
Qloss(f, dq) = E{dq(qtrg, ot, ot+1)}
=
∑
qtrg,ot,ot+1
Pr{qtrg, ot, ot+1}dq(qtrg, ot, ot+1).
5.4 Optimal Attacks and Defenses via Linear
Programming
Having reduced the LPPM design to a Stackelberg game
max-minimization, we now compute the equilibrium of the
game, which is equivalent to computing the optimal defense
f and attack h.
Note that there is an infinity of candidate fs and hs
(all possible probability distributions), so enumeration (as
shown in Figure 5) cannot be used directly as an algorithm
to find the equilibrium. To overcome this problem, we use
a standard technique for transforming the computation of a
game theoretic equilibrium to a linear program. This tech-
nique introduces auxiliary variables xopost , for each possi-
ble value of opost, which roughly correspond to the amount
of privacy gained when the LPPM reports each particular
value of opost. As previous research [22] has expanded on
this transformation technique, we merely present the key
features of the resulting linear program:
We want to maximize
∑
opost
xopost under the constraint
xopost ≤
∑
atrg
ψ(atrg|opre)f(opost|atrg, opre)dp(aˆtrg, atrg),
∀aˆtrg, opost, (10)
and under the constraint∑
qtrg
opost
Pr{qtrg|opre}Pr{opost|qtrg, opre}dq(qtrg, opost, opre)
≤ Qmaxloss . (11)
Equation (10) is equivalent to the min-maximization (5),
and equation (11) is just the quality constraint (6).
In this way, we can compute the optimal LPPM f∗. The
optimal attack h∗ can either be computed via (5), or by
solving another linear program called the dual. We do not
go into detail about the dual here and point the interested
reader to prior research [22] and to standard textbooks on
linear programming [24].
Having computed the optimal LPPM f∗ and the optimal
attack h∗, the resulting Privacy(f∗, h∗) is the level of pri-
vacy achieved by the user, and the resulting Qloss(f
∗) is the
application’s incurred quality loss.
Alternative quantifications of privacy. As we men-
tioned at the beginning of this section, the optimal LPPM
f∗ depends on all inputs ψ, dp, opre, dq, Qmaxloss , so if any of
these functions or variables changes, a new LPPM must be
computed to maximize privacy. Alternatively, it is possi-
ble to compute an LPPM that maximizes the average pri-
vacy across a range of different values, e.g., opre, or across
a range of different applications represented by different
functions dq. One could also be conservative and compute
instead an LPPM that maximizes the minimum privacy
across a range of values, e.g., opre. In this paper, we take
ψ, dp, opre, dq, Q
max
loss to be given inputs, but we note that it
is not difficult to adapt the framework to accommodate al-
ternatives.
6. EVALUATION
By formulating the LPPM design as an optimization prob-
lem, the LPPM algorithm f(·) is guaranteed to be optimal
among all possible algorithms that respect the same con-
straints. Hence, there is no point in evaluating our design
with simulations or any other heuristic evaluation method.
We nevertheless compare to a sporadic LPPM to stress the
importance of using a trajectory-aware LPPM. The spo-
radic LPPM that we use is the optimal one, as presented
in prior work [22]. Due to incompatible assumptions, we
cannot compare to the trajectory-aware LPPMs in the liter-
ature (see discussion of related work in Section 2). We also
show, for two illustrative scenarios, how our LPPM design
allows to trade off privacy and quality. Finally, we discuss
the run-time complexity of our design.1
For the comparison to the sporadic LPPM and for the
illustration of the privacy-quality tradeoff, we use a real
data set of location traces. These traces, which are one day
long, belong to 10 randomly chosen mobile users (vehicles)
1The optimization problem involved in the LPPM design
(see Section 5.4) can be solved with any linear programming
software. In our evaluation, we used MATLAB’s linprog()
function.
in the San Francisco Bay area from the epfl/mobility dataset
at CRAWDAD [18]. These 10 examples serve to illustrate
the optimality of the LPPMs designed by our method, since
the technique is user-centric and does not need information
about other users.
We discretize both time and location: we divide the Bay
Area into 10×25 equal-size locations, and consider a day to
be composed by 288 time units, one per each 5 minutes. We
emphasize that the granularity of both time and locations
can be arbitrarily selected depending on the required accu-
racy in quantifying privacy and service quality.2 We consider
all the locations that are visited by each user, which on av-
erage is 23.4 locations per user. We also consider all the
transitions that each user has made between these locations
in our dataset.
For both the comparison to the sporadic LPPM and for
the privacy-quality tradeoff, we need to specify all the input
parameters/functions dp, dq, Q
max
loss , opre, ψ.
Without loss of generality, we select the privacy gain dp
and the quality loss dq functions to be the Hamming dis-
tance: dp(aˆtrg, atrg) = 1aˆtrg 6=atrg and dq(qtrg, opost, opre) =
1qtrg 6=(opost,opre). Using the Hamming distance means, tak-
ing the privacy gain as an example, that the only bad case
for privacy is when the attacker correctly estimates the ex-
act value of the target locations (i.e., when aˆtrg is exactly
equal to atrg). All other estimates are equally good for pri-
vacy, regardless, e.g., of the physical distance between the
attacker’s estimate and the true value of atrg. As our quan-
tification of privacy is the expected value of dp(aˆtrg, atrg) –
and the expected value of 1aˆtrg 6=atrg is just the probability of
aˆtrg 6= atrg – in effect we quantify privacy as the probability
that the adversary will make an erroneous estimate.
For the maximum tolerable quality loss Qmaxloss , we do not
specify a single value, but rather compute the achievable
privacy for multiple values, so as to observe the privacy-
quality tradeoff.
For the previously reported events opre, we do not specify
a single value. Instead, the privacy values that we compute
and present in the following figures are averaged over all
possible values of opre, because such an average is more rep-
resentative of the privacy that a user can expect to achieve:∑
opre
Pr{opre}Privacy(ψ, f, h, dp; opre).
We must stress that the actual values obtained in the evalu-
ation depend on context (e.g., user mobility). In this sense,
they amount to the “total” privacy of the user, not just the
privacy that is due to the LPPM alone. However, the evalu-
ation shows that, other context being the same, our LPPMs
achieve the highest “total” privacy value among all mecha-
nisms.
To compute the prior probability ψ(atrg) on the target
events, we use the aforementioned traces to build a first-
order Markov chain on the discretized set of locations. Choos-
2Note that locations need not necessarily form a grid. In
general, a higher number of locations corresponds to higher
granularity, and, as a result, to more precise and more accu-
rate quantification and protection of location privacy. The
only requirement is for time and locations to be discrete.
Of course, more locations and more time instants make the
computation of the LPPM more demanding in resources.
The run-time computation discussion in Section 6.3 elabo-
rates on the effect of the number of time instants and loca-
tions on the complexity of the problem.
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Figure 6: Users’ single-location privacy, using a sporadic
LPPM against two attacks: sporadic attack vs. correlation-
aware attack. For 10 different users (lines), and for various
values of the service quality threshold Qmaxloss (dots), we see
that the privacy against a correlation-aware attack (vertical
axis) is always less than the privacy against a sporadic attack
(horizontal axis).
ing a Markov chain over a different mobility model is arbi-
trary. As mentioned in Section 4, our method can handle
other mobility models as well.
In relation to ψ, notice that, in general, we need to spec-
ify the conditional prior on the target events ψ(atrg|opre),
i.e., the prior given the previously reported events opre (see
Equation (1)). But from the traces we can only compute the
unconditional prior ψ(atrg). The connection between opre
and atrg will typically be given by whatever LPPM was in
use when opre was reported, in conjunction with the uncondi-
tional prior. In the Appendix, we show how this connection
can be established, and how ψ(atrg|opre) can be computed,
for the joint protection of past and present privacy that we
illustrate in this section.
6.1 Comparison to Optimal Sporadic LPPM
A trajectory-oblivious (sporadic) LPPM is typically eval-
uated against an attack that is also sporadic, i.e., an attack
in which location correlation is not taken into account. To
provide quantitative justification for the inadequacy of such
LPPMs and their evaluation when the exposed locations are
correlated, we show in Figure 6 that a correlation-aware at-
tack can achieve much lower privacy than a sporadic attack.
Of course, a sporadic LPPM protects single locations only,
so to compare meaningfully, we pick as objective of the
correlation-aware attack the single-location privacy objec-
tive, i.e., atrg = rt (see Section 5.2). The difference between
the correlation-aware attack and the sporadic attack is that
the former uses the conditional prior probability on the tar-
get location ψ(rt|opre) (for opre = ot−1), whereas the latter
uses the unconditional prior ψ(rt).
Each attack is paired against the same sporadic LPPM
(the optimal one [22], as mentioned earlier), and the results
are plotted across the 10 mobile users and for various values
of the service quality threshold Qmaxloss . As all data points
are below the x = y diagonal, we conclude that privacy in
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Figure 7: Privacy-quality tradeoff in the first scenario
(single-location privacy): Protecting the current location
(atrg = rt), when opre is the pseudolocation reported in the
previous time instant ot−1. Each curve corresponds to one
user.
the correlation-aware attack (x-axis) is lower than privacy
in the sporadic attack (y-axis). The only cases where the
two attacks are equally (un-)successful are when the quality
loss threshold is so high that the sporadic LPPM can inject
enough noise to blur even the inference of a correlation-aware
attack.
6.2 Privacy-Quality Tradeoff
In this section, we illustrate the privacy-quality trade-
off of our LPPMs for two particular scenarios: Protecting
single-location privacy for the current location, taking into
account the immediately previous pseudolocation (atrg = rt
and opre = ot−1), shown in Figure 7; and protecting tran-
sition privacy for the current and future locations (atrg =
(rt, rt+1)), as described in Section 5.3, shown in Figure 8.
Under each of these two scenarios, we construct the op-
timal protection mechanism for each of the 10 users in our
traces (i.e., the mechanism that provides the maximum pri-
vacy for her). We plot this maximum privacy as a function
of the service quality threshold Qmaxloss . We see in both fig-
ures that the achievable privacy increases as Qmaxloss increases.
This is not surprising, as higher values ofQmaxloss let the LPPM
inject more and more noise.
However, in both scenarios we observe two effects: First,
a saturation effect takes place for most users as Qmaxloss in-
creases. Their privacy reaches a plateau beyond which any
further increase inQmaxloss does not contribute to a correspond-
ing increase in privacy. Second, the privacy plateau, as well
as the privacy level for any value of Qmaxloss , is not the same for
all users. This suggests that not all users can be protected
equally well, but rather there is some inherent privacy limit
for each user that is connected to the user’s mobility. Users
with more predictable mobility cannot be protected as ef-
ficiently as less predictable ones, regardless of the amount
of noise that the LPPM injects. Looking at the figures,
more predictable users correspond to the lowest curves in
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Figure 8: Privacy-quality tradeoff in the second scenario
(transition privacy): Protecting the current and the next
location (atrg = (rt, rt+1)). Each curve corresponds to one
user.
Figures 7 and 8, whereas users with more random mobility
correspond to the highest curves.
It is worth noting at this point that both these effects
are not artefacts of our LPPM. Our LPPMs provide the
best possible protection, so these effects are inherent in the
mobility patterns of the users.
6.3 Computational Considerations
Our mechanism is intended to be computed offline and
used online: The LPPM function f(opost|atrg, opre) is pre-
computed offline and then downloaded to the device. Then,
whenever the user attempts to expose a location, the LPPM
looks up and performs the appropriate randomization on
pseudolocations opost, based on the actual values of the tar-
get events to be protected atrg and the previously exposed
vector of pseudolocations opre. In this way, the only compu-
tational burden of the resource-constrained mobile device is
a look-up and a randomized selection of opost.
The offline computation of the LPPM function f requires
solving a separate linear program for each value of opre that
may arise in practice. But most of the theoretically possible
values of the vector opre are nonsensical sequences of loca-
tions, e.g., sequences where successive locations are too far
away from each other, so these need not be taken into ac-
count, which saves considerable time. Similarly, the number
of variables in each linear program is theoretically equal to
the total number of pairs of atrg and opost vectors, since a
value for f must be computed for each such combination.
This number is M length(atrg)+length(opost) (recall that M is
the total number of locations – see Section 4), but in practice
it is much smaller. The actual number of linear programs
and of variables is closer to the number of likely trajectories
of the corresponding length (the number of linear programs
is equal to the number of trajectories of length length(opre),
whereas the number of variables is equal to the number of
trajectories of length length(atrg) + length(opost)).
It is very important to notice also that the computation
of f needs to be done only once, so the associated cost only
needs to be incurred once. A recomputation of f is only
necessary if, for example, the user parameters or applica-
tion parameters dp, dq, Q
max
loss change, or if the user wants
to protect a different aspect of her privacy (e.g., previous,
present, and next location, instead of just present and next
location), which would translate to a change in atrg, or if
one wishes to take into account different prior knowledge of
previously reported pseudolocations opre (e.g., take into ac-
count the 3 previously reported pseudolocations instead of
just one).
7. CONCLUSIONS
Existing location privacy-preserving mechanisms either ig-
nore the information leaked by the exposure of correlated
locations, or ignore that the adversary will adapt his at-
tack to the protection mechanism. Hence, in practice, these
schemes do not provide the promised level of privacy. In
this paper, we have proposed a framework that simultane-
ously considers correlation and the background knowledge
of the adversary, namely the mobility profile of the user, the
previously exposed locations, and the internal algorithm im-
plemented by the protected mechanism; while at the same
time respecting the user’s service quality requirements.
Our framework allows users to design LPPMs that protect
not only her current location, but also her past and future
whereabouts. Furthermore, our solution is the first to deal
with protecting the privacy of transitions between locations,
and with preserving the privacy of locations from which the
user does not access the location based service. Two key
advantages of the framework are that it is not limited to
a particular scenario, but can be used to compute optimal
defenses for different privacy and quality user preferences;
and that it finds an optimal defense among a wide variety
of conceivable mechanisms, effectively any mechanism that
can be modeled as a probability distribution describing how
obfuscated locations are produced from real locations.
Using real mobility traces, we show that users can relax
their quality of service requirements in exchange for privacy,
but the predictability of their movements determines the
maximum protection they can obtain. The privacy level
achieved by the LPPMs computed using our framework can
be considered an upper bound on the privacy achievable by
any defense in presence of a strategic adversary who knows
the users’ mobility patterns. Hence, our solution is ideal to
be used as benchmark to measure the effectiveness of future
defenses.
Acknowledgments
Carmela Troncoso’s research is partially supported by EU
7th Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant
agreements 610613 (PRIPARE) and 285901 (LIFTGATE).
George Theodorakopoulos’s research was partially supported
by EU FP7 EINS (grant agreement No 288201).
8. REFERENCES
[1] O. Abul, F. Bonchi, and M. Nanni.Never walk alone:
Uncertainty for anonymity in moving objects
databases.In 24th International Conference on Data
Engineering (ICDE 2008), pages 376–385. IEEE, 2008.
[2] M. E. Andre´s, N. E. Bordenabe, K. Chatzikokolakis,
and C. Palamidessi.Geo-indistinguishability:
Differential privacy for location-based systems.In
ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security (CCS’13), pages 901–914. ACM, 2013.
[3] C. A. Ardagna, G. Livraga, and
P. Samarati.Protecting privacy of user information in
continuous location-based services.In 15th
International Conference on Computational Science
and Engineering (CSE), pages 162–169. IEEE, 2012.
[4] A. R. Beresford and F. Stajano.Location privacy in
pervasive computing.IEEE Pervasive Computing,
2(1):46–55, 2003.
[5] N. E. Bordenabe, K. Chatzikokolakis, and
C. Palamidessi.Optimal geo-indistinguishable
mechanisms for location privacy.arXiv preprint
arXiv:1402.5029, 2014.
[6] K. Chatzikokolakis, C. Palamidessi, and M. Stronati.A
predictive differentially-private mechanism for
mobility traces.In Privacy Enhancing Technologies,
pages 21–41. Springer International Publishing, 2014.
[7] R. Cheng, Y. Zhang, E. Bertino, and
S. Prabhakar.Preserving user location privacy in
mobile data management infrastructures.In 6th
International Workshop on Privacy Enhancing
Technologies (PET 2006), pages 393–412, 2006.
[8] C.-Y. Chow and M. F. Mokbel.Trajectory privacy in
location-based services and data publication.SIGKDD
Explorations Newsletter, 13(1):19–29, June 2011.
[9] M. L. Damiani, E. Bertino, and C. Silvestri.The
PROBE framework for the personalized cloaking of
private locations.Transactions on Data Privacy,
3(2):123–148, 2010.
[10] J. Freudiger, R. Shokri, and J.-P. Hubaux.On the
optimal placement of mix zones.In PETS ’09:
Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on
Privacy Enhancing Technologies, pages 216–234, 2009.
[11] S. Gao, J. Ma, W. Shi, G. Zhan, and C. Sun.TrPF: A
trajectory privacy-preserving framework for
participatory sensing.IEEE Transactions on
Information Forensics and Security, 8(6):874–887,
June 2013.
[12] G. Ghinita, M. L. Damiani, C. Silvestri, and
E. Bertino.Preventing velocity-based linkage attacks in
location-aware applications.In 17th ACM
SIGSPATIAL International Symposium on Advances
in Geographic Information Systems (ACM-GIS 2009),
pages 246–255. ACM, 2009.
[13] G. Gido´falvi, X. Huang, and T. B.
Pedersen.Privacy-preserving data mining on moving
object trajectories.In 8th International Conference on
Mobile Data Management (MDM 2007), pages 60–68.
IEEE, 2007.
[14] B. Hoh, M. Gruteser, H. Xiong, and
A. Alrabady.Achieving guaranteed anonymity in gps
traces via uncertainty-aware path cloaking.IEEE
Transactions in Mobile Computing, 9(8):1089–1107,
2010.
[15] L. Huang, H. Yamane, K. Matsuura, and
K. Sezaki.Silent cascade: Enhancing location privacy
without communication QoS degradation.In Security
of Pervasive Computing (SPC), pages 165–180, 2006.
[16] M. E. Nergiz, M. Atzori, Y. Saygin, and
B. Gu¨c¸.Towards trajectory anonymization: a
generalization-based approach.Transactions on Data
Privacy, 2(1):47–75, 2009.
[17] X. Pan, X. Meng, and J. Xu.Distortion-based
anonymity for continuous queries in location-based
mobile services.In 17th ACM SIGSPATIAL
International Symposium on Advances in Geographic
Information Systems (ACM-GIS 2009), pages
256–265, 2009.
[18] M. Piorkowski, N. Sarafijanovic-Djukic, and
M. Grossglauser.CRAWDAD data set epfl/mobility
(v. 2009-02-24).
[19] L. R. Rabiner.A tutorial on hidden Markov models
and selected applications in speech
recognition.Proceedings of the IEEE, 77(2):257–286,
1989.
[20] R. Shokri.Optimal user-centric data obfuscation.arXiv
preprint arXiv:1402.3426, 2014.
[21] R. Shokri, G. Theodorakopoulos, G. Danezis, J.-P.
Hubaux, and J.-Y. Le Boudec.Quantifying location
privacy: the case of sporadic location exposure.In
Proceedings of the 11th international conference on
Privacy enhancing technologies (PETS’11), pages
57–76, 2011.
[22] R. Shokri, G. Theodorakopoulos, C. Troncoso, J.-P.
Hubaux, and J.-Y. Le Boudec.Protecting location
privacy: optimal strategy against localization
attacks.In ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications Security (CCS’12), pages 617–627,
2012.
[23] M. Terrovitis and N. Mamoulis.Privacy preservation in
the publication of trajectories.In 9th International
Conference on Mobile Data Management (MDM ’08),
pages 65–72. IEEE, 2008.
[24] R. J. Vanderbei.Linear programming, volume
114.Springer, 2008.
[25] T.-H. You, W.-C. Peng, and W.-C. Lee.Protecting moving
trajectories with dummies.In 8th International Conference
on Mobile Data Management (MDM ’07), pages 278–282,
May 2007.
APPENDIX
Computing the Conditional Prior
As mentioned in Section 6, function ψ(rt, rτ |oτ ) needs to be
specified as input to the linear program (7), which computes
the LPPM for the joint protection of past and present. We
now describe how this computation can be performed for the
case k = 1, i.e., when opre = oτ = ot−1, and the objective
is to protect only the current and the previous locations:
atrg = (rt, rτ ) = (rt, rt−1).
In general, recall that t takes values from T = {1, 2, ...}.
We first describe the cases t = 1 and t = 2, which form the
base cases of the recursion, and then we handle the general
case t > 2.
If t = 1, variables rt−1 and ot−1 do not make sense, as
there is no previous LBS-access location nor observation.
In this case, ψ(rt, rt−1|ot−1) is just ψ(rt) and it is equal to
the steady state probability ψ(r), r ∈ R as computed from
the transition matrix P . Then, the solution f of the linear
program is equivalent to a sporadic LPPM [22], so we call it
fspor.
If t = 2, the computation proceeds as follows:
ψ(rt, rt−1|ot−1) = Pr{rt|rt−1, ot−1}Pr{rt−1|ot−1} (12)
But Pr{rt|rt−1, ot−1} = Pr{rt|rt−1}, which is known from
the transition matrix P . So we only need to compute Pr{rt−1|ot−1},
which we do with Bayes’ rule:
Pr{rt−1|ot−1} = Pr{ot−1|rt−1}Pr{rt−1}∑
rt−1 Pr{ot−1|rt−1}Pr{rt−1}
(13)
Now, Pr{rt−1} is known (it is the steady state of P ), so we
only need to compute Pr{ot−1|rt−1}.
Only in the case of t = 2, it holds that Pr{ot−1|rt−1} =
fspor(ot−1|rt−1), and fspor is computed in the t = 1 step.
This concludes the case t = 2.
In the general case, t > 2, we derive ψ(rt, rt−1|ot−1) just
as for t = 2 up to the application of Bayes’ rule. The differ-
ence is that we can no longer substitute fspor for Pr{ot−1|rt−1},
so we need to compute it directly:
Pr{ot−1|rt−1} =
∑
ot−2,rt−2
Pr{ot−1, rt−2, ot−2|rt−1}
=
∑
ot−2,rt−2
Pr{ot−1|rt−1, rt−2, ot−2}Pr{rt−2, ot−2|rt−1}
=
∑
ot−2,rt−2
Pr{ot−1|rt−1, rt−2, ot−2}Pr{ot−2|rt−2, rt−1}
Pr{rt−2|rt−1} (14)
The first term is f as computed for time t − 1. The third
term is known from the transition matrix P . The second
term Pr{ot−2|rt−2, rt−1} is equal to Pr{ot−2|rt−2}, because
the obfuscation at time t−2 depends only on rt−2, rt−3, and
ot−3. Knowing rt−1 when rt−2 is already known gives us no
extra information on rt−3 or ot−3. Hence, the computation
of Pr{ot−1|rt−1} is shown to be recursive:
Pr{ot−1|rt−1} =
∑
ot−2,rt−2
f(ot−1|rt−1, rt−2, ot−2)
Pr{ot−2|rt−2}Pr{rt−2|rt−1}. (15)
After computing ψ(rt, rt−1|ot−1), we can solve the linear
program and find the optimal LPPM for the user, which is
dependent on the previous observed location of the user.
